Climate carbon negotiations: a black hole, and a new idea
If there is no post-Kyoto climate deal, of the kind attempted at Copenhagen, few if any will care. Jeanette Fitzsimons, back in the country and back at work, tells Pundit why she doubts Kyoto and the ETS can help us. She wants to start again
It turns out that Copenhagen was, in fact, more of a failure than we knew: it was not the destination some hoped, not even another milestone, but a rock in the road so large that we may need to take another route.
The first Kyoto Protocol commitment period ends in 2012, with nothing so far to replace it. Kyoto, which makes developed countries cut or pay for some of their emissions, has been a key part, to date, of international climate change response. But in fact, if there is no post-Kyoto deal, in the sense that we currently understand that idea, it seems that few will care. Nobody really wants that particular kind of deal any more, but for very different reasons.
Climate sceptics and ‘realists’ have never wanted a response. Nor have politicians really, watching their economic backs, and their votes. But now even some of the advocates, after two decades of largely failed and flawed negotiations, are saying we need to do something different.
Sooner or later, then, Kyoto seems doomed, if there is nobody left to fight for it. Either the talks will fold, or produce a response that is not robust in real climate terms. And if anyone is still willing to stand up for it, it may be for all the wrong reasons, because of the further opportunities for denial and prevarication it offers them.
We need to start figuring out what to do instead, because doing nothing is not an option. The stakes have never been higher. There is no time, five years out from the point at which emissions need to peak. Massive damage to political and public goodwill seems inevitable, from any decision to scrap it all and start again. The risk is that we slip back into in-fighting and inertia.
To understand why anyone, especially Fitzsimons, would advocate this, it’s necessary to understand that Kyoto’s risks are now seen as even greater.
Since Kyoto was signed, international climate change policy has become, essentially, a carbon trading policy: liability for emissions over caps set under the Protocol; along with a general move towards emissions trading schemes, to allow polluters to trade, and limit their liability.
At Copenhagen, countries did two things: they signed up to an accord to limit global warming to two degrees, or 450 parts per million (ppm) greenhouse gas in the atmosphere; and made pledges about per country reductions.
There are doubts, anyway, that atmospheric CO2 of 450 ppm is enough to avoid dangerous climate change, but even assuming that it is, Kyoto (and Copenhagen, etc) will not deliver it.
The Sustainability Council’s Simon Terry (co-author of The Carbon Challenge, with Geoff Bertram) has reviewed international literature on the pledges. There is, he says, close agreement across all of those independent studies that, taken at face value, the pledges commit to reducing developed country emissions to between 12 and 18% below 1990 levels.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recommended a 25-40% cut. The combined pledges are not only, therefore, too low; the IPCC based its conclusions on outdated science. The only thing certain about the science seems to be that projections for emissions, and their effects, consistently turn out worse than expected. A reduction on 1990 levels of 25-40% would not be enough, in other words, and the promises made are far less.
There are also so many things that are ‘hot air’ or don’t count under the Kyoto accounting rules that in effect, by the time all those hidden emissions are factored in, Terry warns there may be no cuts at all, in real atmospheric terms.
The loopholes include so-called ‘hot air’, from eastern European economies’ collapse, shortly after the 1990 base year. International aviation and shipping emissions, up 60% since 1990 and set to double by 2020, are not counted under the Protocol; there are also proposed force majeure exclusions, for carbon-emitting wildfires. Subject to negotiations still in progress, parties may be able to choose what land use changes to account for, or not (eg, soil carbon, forestation), and fiddle the books in other ways.
For this, and other reasons, a growing number (and a critical mass?) are losing or have lost faith in the process. They believe this toxic mix of politics and creative accounting around Kyoto guarantees only one thing: that we will fail, because the climate cares about neither. Kyoto’s past performance shows:
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Endless arguments about who is responsible for what — for example, should China be responsible for emissions generated, in manufacturing consumer goods for export?
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Measurement problems, in quantifying emissions and their reductions, to put a price on them. For example, the formulae for converting the other five greenhouse gases to CO2 equivalents (the basis for Kyoto accounting) are uncertain, and could be confounded, by big margins of error.
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Countries setting their targets pragmatically, by what they can achieve and are politically prepared to wear, without any reference to what is necessary to meet the policy objective of avoiding dangerous climate change.
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Emissions trading schemes ‘smoothing’ the transition to a low carbon economy — postponing it, in other words, by giving polluters an option to keep externalising their sunk costs. Emissions trading schemes are another delaying tactic, not a response.
“If governments wish to adhere to the FCCC mandate of avoiding dangerous climate change, a new approach is required,” Terry concludes. He is referring to the 1992 framework convention on climate change, and believes that mechanisms in addition to the FCCC negotiations are going to be needed.